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Abstract        
  
We examine the Taiwanese market for covered warrants, and the impact of the expiration of a 
covered warrant on the returns, and trading volume of the underlying stock. This paper seeks 
to address the impact of warrant expiration on the underlying shares. It proposes several 
sample groups in which such impact may emerge different outcome. Overall, the hypotheses 
of there are significant price effect and abnormal trading volume around the warrant 
expirations cannot be rejected. The hypotheses of different price effect and trading volume in 
sub groups also have been confirmed. This study makes extensive of data from Taiwanese 
market and several sample groups; the empirical analysis can also serve as a means to 
improve academic knowledge of impact derivative expiration event on the underlying shares. 
We conclude that the feature of the sample set does generate different results and we also 
provider alternative explanations to the empirical outcome.  
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1. Introduction 
Previous research in the covered warrants literature has neglected to consider the issue of 
warrant expiration. One of the plausible explanations may be the short of investigation period 
and lack of sample. The evolvement of Taiwan covered warrants was in 1997; therefore it is a 
relatively new financial derivative to the capital market. As a result, studies in Taiwan covered 
warrant market not just short but also contain a small sample sets. We are motivated in part by 
the fact of lack of academic research on the issue of derivative expiration. This paper 
contributes to the literature regarding another kind of financial derivative, with a central focus 
on the event of covered warrants expiration. We hope to address the gap in the covered 
warrants literature with a focus on the Taiwanese market.  
The investigation of the price effect around options expiration requires us to look at the 
significance of abnormal return (Klemekosky (1978), Klemkosky and Maness (1980), Officer 
and Trennepohl (1981)). There is also a possibility that the issuer and investor create a 
down-turn price pressure through closing their position in the spot market as the options come 
to expiration (Klemekosky (1978) and Pope and Yadav (1992)). To summarize the above 
views, a significant price effect is likely to generate within the pre-expiration event window. 
However, if the evidence supports the semi-strong market efficiency theory, then there is no 
significant price effect to the option expiration (Bollen and Whaley (1999), Stoll and Whaley 
(1987, 1991)). Another interesting question is whether the option expiration contains any new 
information about the company and has the same reaction from the underlying share similar to 
the option introduction (Ross (1977)). The introduction of the option could affect the 
underlying asset because it might accelerate information efficiency; however, when option 
expiration is expected and it does not have the role of revealing company information, we 
might generate an insignificant price effect in underlying asset. For studies highlighting on the 
covered warrants market, Draper et al. (2001) and Chen and Wu (2001) obtain a negative 
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price effect after warrant delisting, however, Chen and Wu (2001) also generate a positive 
price effect prior to the warrants expiration. Hsu and Wang (2003) select 9 covered single call 
covered warrants between 2000 and 2001 from Taiwan covered warrants market. They apply 
the market model to examine the abnormal price effect of the underlying share around warrant 
introduction, listing and expiration days. Their empirical result confirms there is no 
significant change in abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns when warrants 
expired.  
Te abnormal price effect could be caused by the abnormal trading behaviour between the 
seller and buyer in the market. It is likely that abnormal trading volume associated with the 
price effect in the event of warrant expiration. With the time pass by it is also possible that 
both price effect and abnormal trading volume been absorbed after the market participants 
reacted to the news. A few numbers of studies have examined the change of underlying asset 
trading volume around derivatives expiration in the various capital markets (Bhattacharya 
(1987), Chamerlain et al. (1989), Stall and Whaley (1991), Pope and Yadav (1992), Karolyi 
(1996), Draper et al. (1997), Chen and Wu (2001)). The empirical evidence are inconclusive, 
some research emerge significant change in trading volume. The plausible explanation is that 
the issuer starts to dispose their position in the spot market just before the option expiries; 
therefore, they create a high abnormal trading volume in the underlying asset market. As soon 
as these abnormal transactions become normal again when option expires, the trading volume 
also goes back to normal.  
The central notion of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama (1970)) has suggested that the 
invention and trading of the option should be a separate scenario and hence has no impact on 
the underlying share if the market if efficient. Ross (1976) suggests that the existence of the 
options market improves market efficiency. Rubinstein (1985) agrees that the launch of the 
options market increases the investment opportunity for both firms and individual investors 
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and also increases the efficiency of the securities markets. However, if the evidence supports 
the semi-strong market efficiency theory, there would be no significant price effect to the 
option expiration.  
Nevertheless, the attempt to establish a link between option expiration is at present 
inconclusive. This is why the aim of the paper is to give a clearer idea about covered warrants 
expiration. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 covers previous literature 
and hypotheses; section 3 deals with sample selection and methodology, section 4 focuses on 
empirical results and section 5 is the conclusion.   
 
2. Previous Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Price Effect 
For the price effect on the derivative expirations, researchers provide various explanations. 
Klemekosky (1978), Klemkosky and Maness (1980), Officer and Trennepohl (1981) all 
suggest that the arbitrage transactions may cause a temporary price effect around the 
expiration date. They suggest that there is no price effect on the expiration of options. Officer 
and Trennepohl (1981) claim that there should be abnormal returns due to the change of 
trading volume in underlying assets around the date when the options expire, but this could be 
offset by search cost, transaction cost and tax. Stoll and Whaley (1987, 1990) claim that 
arbitrage activity does not cause price distortions. Bhattacharya (1987) notes that when the 
options approach the expiration time, some options holders may try to manipulate the futures 
price in order to benefit from the options market. Bollen and Whaley (1999) provide two 
alternative explanations for the insignificant price effect; the first that it is due to the early 
unwinding of the contract; the second is the popularity of the arbitrage programme. The 
authors claim that this may be only a recent phenomenon and therefore does not influence the 
underlying stocks.  
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This paper is the first attempt to examine the price effect of first and subsequent warrants 
expirations to the best of our knowledge. The different feature between the first time and 
subsequent expiration is expected due to the empirical evidence from warrant introduction. 
Furthermore, Draper et al. (2001) report negative price effect for both in and 
out-of-the-money groups in Hong Kong. Chan and Wu. (2001) report that the in-the-money 
warrants show a positive price effect before the warrant expiration and negative price effect 
after the expiration. The out-of-the-money group obtains negative price effect around the 
warrant expiration. We also divide the sample groups into in-the-money and out-of-the-money 
group, hoping to find different attribute between the two sub sample groups. There are reasons 
to believe that option expiration could have impact on underlying stocks. Therefore we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a price effect on underlying stocks around (before and after) covered warrants 
expirations 
H2: The sub-sample of first time expired covered warrants exhibit a different price effect from 
the sub-sample of subsequently expired warrants 
H3: The sub-sample of in-the-money expired covered warrants exhibit a different price effect 
from the sub-sample of out-of-the-money warrants 
 
2.2 Change of Trading volume 
In the US market, Stall and Whaley (1991) suggest that the trading volume increases before 
the option expiration but falls after it, which is inconsistent with the insignificant finding by 
Bhattacharya (1987). Chamerlain et al. (1989) confirm insignificant result by examining the 
Canada market. Karolyi (1996), Draper et al. (1997), and Chen and Wu (2001) emerge 
positive trading volume in the Japanese futures options market and Hong Kong derivative 
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warrant market respectively. Pope and Yadav (1992) confirm a positive trading volume prior 
to and negative trading volume post the option expiration in the U.K.  
Draper et al. (2001) claim that in their test of trading volume there was no significant effect 
associated with the listing of warrants; underlying stocks experience increased volume to the 
news of warrants delisting. Chen and Wu (2001)’s result is different; they find that the trading 
volume drops significantly around the maturity date. 
Pope and Yadav (1992) suggest that because of the time premium of the call option, it should 
be more profitable to sell the call option than to exercise it much before option expiration. 
Hence, one would expect the stock trading volume could be peaked just before the option 
expiration because of call option exercise. 
Chan and Wu (2001) there is significant trading volume change in both in-the-money and 
out-of-the-money expiration groups. To the best of our knowledge, none of the studies have 
investigated the change in abnormal trading volume of underlying shares after covered 
warrants expiration in Taiwan. The change of underlying share price is likely to be associated 
with movement in the underlying share trading volume. This gives rise to the second 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: The trading volume of underlying stocks changes around (before and after) covered 
warrants listings 
H5: The extent of changes in trading volume of underlying stocks for first time covered 
warrants expiration is different from the extent of changes associated with the subsequent 
expiration 
H6: The extent of changes in trading volume of underlying stocks for in-the-money covered 
warrants expirations is different from the extent of changes associated with the 
out-of-the-money expirations. 
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There are more reasons for us to set out the above hypotheses on the basis of the institutional 
aspects of observations. It is crucial to consider the overall influence of option expiration on 
the underlying asset, from the scientific perspective; there may be a comprehensive diagram 
for the process and its impact. The expiration of the option will first of all create a high 
trading volume because the arbitragers, investors and the issuer will no longer have need to 
arbitrage, to hedge or to hold the underlying asset. A very important feature of the covered 
warrants, unlike the options, as we mentioned earlier, is that the options are issued by the 
stock exchange or clearing house itself, whereas a third party issues the covered warrants, 
normally investment banks. This feature actually plays a vital role in the event of covered 
warrants expirations. First, the government has required the issuer to provide a certain amount 
of hedging in order to prevent both parties from default risk. Therefore as the expiration dates 
approach, the issuer has to prepare enough shares in case the warrant holders ask for exercise 
when the warrants are in the money. Secondly, if the covered warrant is likely to expire 
out-of-the-money, the issuer may start to close off his hedging position by selling the shares in 
the market. Thirdly, there is a chance, as a counter-example, if the covered warrant is likely to 
expire in-the-money, the issuers and also some investors may try to manipulate the underlying 
share price in order to sell their shares at a better price later on. Fourthly, there is also a 
possibility that the price and trading volume of the underlying shares will suddenly go up 
because the demand for the underlying shares will shift back to the spot markets due to the 
lack of another financial assets. From above, we see that there are reasons to believe that the 
event of the covered warrant expiration affects the underlying shares. On the basis of these 
reasons derived from the Taiwanese market specifically and also from the previous literature, 
we then develop the above hypotheses.   
The Taiwanese government has also applied capital constraint requirements to shares which 
can qualify as underlying shares. A list of companies can be selected as the committee reveals 
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underlying shares every three months. Therefore multiple listing situations arise in the 
Taiwanese market in which one underlying share might have more than one covered warrant 
presented at the same time. For this crucial phenomenon, in the present paper we choose to 
observe abnormal trading activities during the short-term pre and post warrant expiration, 
rather than examining the change of systematic risk and long term stock volatility after 
covered warrant expiration. The reason for this is that we simply cannot claim the flotation of 
the systematic risk and long-term stock volatility change after the warrants expiration is due 
to expiration itself. As the warrants are no longer trading, the long term proxy should not 
contain any information regarding either the event or this particular asset. Moreover, there are 
numerous different events which may emerge for the underlying company after the warrants 
have expired and we cannot distinguish the impact of one particular event from another.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample consists of 138 covered warrants expirations, including 50 first expiration covered 
warrants. The sample is drawn from data between August 1998 and August 2003. The daily 
closing prices of the underlying stocks and covered warrants were chosen.1 The expiration 
date is the day when the covered warrant matured, which normally would be a year after the 
listing of the covered warrant, but a few of them expired after 6 months.2 The daily 
underlying stocks and market trading volumes, daily trading volume and turnover of each 
underlying share are collected from the Taiwanese Economics Journal (TEJ) database. We 
further split our sample into an in-the-money group and an out-of-the-money group. In total, 
32 warrants expired in-the-money, and 106 warrants expired out-of-the-money. 10 out of 32 
                                                 
1 Daily stock return is calculated rt=ln ( Pt/PPt-1), where P is the daily closing price.  
2 Cs1, tone4, asus4, paoc3, weis2, scip4, huhi1, ts5, kmt1, huay1, thu1, kua2, and yulg1, 13 in total have a - 
month maturity period. 
 11
in-the-money warrants are first time expired and the remaining 22 samples belonged to the 
subsequent-expired sample set. To summarize, 5 sample sets are examined, including the total 
sample group (138 covered warrants), the first time expired group (50 covered warrants), the 
subsequent expired group (88 covered warrants), the in the money group (32) and the out of 
the money group (106) covered warrants.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
Price Effect 
Daily stock returns are calculated 160 (60) days before and 10 days after the expiration of the 
covered warrant. An event study methodology is applied to examine the abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal returns happening before and after the warrant expiration. The period 10 
days before and 10 days after the warrants expiration are set as the event windows. We 
applied two estimation periods to ensure the robustness of our empirical examination. One is 
150 days before the event window; the other is 50 days before the event window. 150 days 
represents a long-term estimation and 50 days represents a short-term measurement. If we 
select too long as the estimation period, the next warrant expiration with the same underlying 
shares might affect the estimation; therefore, 150 days and 50 days seem to be reasonable 
measurements.    
Between each covered warrants event/expiration, we make sure there is a two months gap of 
multiple listing, to make our estimation period more accurate. The length of the event window 
has been subjective in all the previous literature. In the covered warrants study, Chen and Wu 
(2001) choose 15 days as their event window, whereas Pope and Yadav (1992) select 5 days 
as the event window. We choose 10 days before and after the expiration window. The reason 
for this length is as follows: 1). The expiration of covered warrants is considered as news 
releasing; therefore it is unlikely to have a permanent influence on the underlying shares; 2). 
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Fama et al. (1969) suggested that the event window can be selected before and after the event 
and that it can also be extended up to the event. In order to observe the information linkage 
(Ball and Brown (1968)), we choose 2 weeks trading days before and after the expirations in 
order to capture the impact of the event.  
 
3.1 Abnormal Return  
The market model is adopted to examine the abnormal return, Brenner (1977) discusses 
variants models in the event study and he claims that the market model performs as good as 
other variants. The underlying share prices are determined partially by the market returns, 
market model is a fit model for our case.   
Under the market model, the expected rate of stock return is calculated by the following OLS 
(Ordinary Least Square) estimation during the estimation period. The expected stock return 
during the event window is: 
  
E{Rit| Xt} = α + β*Rmt       E∈W                                (1.4) 
     
Rit is the return on individual underlying stock, Rmt is the return on market index. 
After using the estimation period to estimate αi and βi, the abnormal return during the event 
window equals to: 
 
ˆˆARit = Rit - ( i + i* Rmt)α β ,   t = 0,1,2,3…..T                 (1.5)    
  
Rit denoted the actual return of individual underlying stock during the event window and 
( ˆˆ i + i* Rmtα β ) is the theoratical stock returns. 
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The aberage abnormal returns (Brown and Warner (1985)) during the event window equal to : 
ARE = 
1
N 1
N
iE
i
AR
=
∑   E∈W = 3, 4t t                                 (1.6) 
 
Karafiath (1988) sets a dummy variable every day to consolidate both estimation period and 
event window data.  
                
Rit = αi +βi *Rmt + 
T
j=0 
rijDjt ∑  + εit,        i= 1,….N,  t = -T1,…..,T.         (1.7) 
                                                    
 
Djt = { 1, if t = j    }, { 0, otherwise } 
   
3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
To test the cumulative abnormal return, the following formula is adopted (Fama et.al. (1969)): 
CAR (T1, T2) = 
2
1
T
E
E T
AR
=
∑    [ T1,T2] ⊂  [ t3,t4]   (2.1) 
 
To overcome problems of cross-sectional dependence and event-induced variance change, 
The Sign test is applied to test the significance of abnormal return in the event window.  
 
3.3 Change of Relative Trading Volume Before and After Warrants Expiration 
To examine the change of trading volume 100 days before and after the warrant expiration, 
we define the relative trading volume as the average ratio of a firm daily trading volume 
divided by total daily trading volume of the market over estimation period and the event 
window. The relative trading volume is measured as: 
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RVi,B = ( Vi, t-s/ TVm, t-s) *100                                        (3.1) 
RVi,A = ( Vi, t+s/ TVm, t+s) *100                                       (3.2) 
 
where RVi,B is the average daily relative stock trading volume before the warrants expiration 
and RVi,A is the average daily relative trading volume of security  after the warrants 
expiration. 172 average ratios will be obtained. The Mann-Whitney test is adopted to test for 
the inequality of trading volume before and after the expiration of covered warrants. 
 
Abnormal Trading Volume During the Event Window 
Here we present a method to examine daily abnormal returns during the event window, this 
method is first derived by Michaely et al. (1995). Chen and Wu (2001) have adopted the 
medal to examine abnormal trading volume in their study.  Daily turnover ratio is used as a 
proxy of trading volume. We choose 150 days and 50 days prior to the event window as our 
estimation period to calculate the average turnover ratio. The abnormal trading volume is 
defined as AR and obtained from comparing the daily turnover ratio within the event window 
to the average turnover ratio.  
First of all, the daily stock turnover for individual underlying share is calculated as: 
 
Toit = Number of shares traded it / Number of shares outstanding it 
i = 1….N    , number of underlying shares, in total, N=138 
t = -160….-11 for 150 days estimation period, and –60….-11 for 50 days estimation period. 
The average estimated daily turnover for each underlying share is  
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11
160
/150i it
t
TO TO
−
=−
= ∑  for 150 days estimation period                     (3.3) 
 
and 
11
60
/ 50i it
t
TO TO
−
=−
= ∑  respectively.                                 (3.4) 
 
The cross sectional daily turnover for day t is average turnover for all underlying shares, 
 
1
1 N it
t
i i
TOTO
N TO=
= ∑     t = -160…-11 ( -61 …-11 respectively,)        (3.5) 
N = number of shares = 138. 
itTO  = daily turnover at day t for each share, tTO  is the average turnover for each share.  
The abnormal trading volume is calculated  
1AVit TOt= − ,   TOt is the cross sectional daily turnover   
t = -161….-11 , (-61….-11) respectively.  
 
S.D. (AVt) = 
11
2
160
1 ( )
149 t
AV AV
−
−
−∑
11
60
50
t
t
AV
AV
−
=−=
∑
,                  (3.6) 
 
Or 
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2
60
1 ( )
49 t
AV AV
−
−
−∑ ,   
11
60
50
t
t
AV
AV
−
=−=
∑
     for 50 days estimation period.  
 
By calculating the average cross sectional abnormal trading volume we are able to observe the 
interactions between underlying share price performance and trading volume within the event 
window, which seizes impact of covered warrants expiration on the underlying shares in more 
detail.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The price effect is examined by applying market model. We applied two estimation periods, 
one is 150 days and the other is 50 days, to improve the robustness of our empirical testing. 
Result of 150-day estimation is presented here and the 50-day estimation generates consistent 
result as 150 day- estimation. Results for the 50-day estimation are available on request. 
Given emphasis to the importance of the nature of the covered warrants, 5 sample sets are 
examined based on diffident attribute. The 5 groups include the total sample group, the first 
time expired group, the subsequent expired groups, the in-the-money group and the 
out-of-the-money group. The in-the-money group includes those expired with in-the-money 
market price and the out-of-the-money group includes those could not be exercised when 
warrants were expired. We are hoping to find a distinct feature of the group which obtains 
significant trading behaviour on the basis of different categories.  
The results of the expiration of covered warrant show different features in the total sample set, 
the first expired warrant sample and the subsequent expired group. The total sample set finds 
insignificant change in the ARs around the warrant expirations. This result is consistent with 
Hsu and Wang (2003). However, for the first time expired group, when it comes to warrant 
expiration, significant price effects can be obtained within the event window on day –2,0,2 for 
the ARs. The subsequent sample set confirms significant ARs on day –4. 3  
Overall, both total sample and subsequent group show similar conclusions, that there are 
insignificant results in ARs around the warrants expirations. However, the first expiration 
group generates significant positive price effect. To the contrary, the total sample and 
subsequent sample set emerge none significant evidence.  
                                                 
3The 50-day estimation period for the total sample finds significant ARs on day 6 and 10, significant CARs on 
day –5. The first time expired group generates significant ARs on day –2,0,2 and CARs on days –8~-5, 2~10. 
The subsequent group shows none significant AR and CAR.  
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We further split our sample set by classifying the sample based on the in-the-money group 
and out-of-the-money group. The in-the-money group generates positive abnormal returns 
prior to the expiration date on day –1, and also negative abnormal returns on days +3, +4. The 
out-of–the-money group obtains the same result that there are positive abnormal returns on 
days –9, -8, +6, + 10.4 
Results emerge from the total sample set and the subsequent sample set are consistent to the 
findings of Bhattacharya (1987), Chamerlain et al. (1989), Stall and Whaley (1991), and 
Karolyi (1996) that there is a little evidence of price effect. The insignificant finding in the 
total sample and subsequent sample group implies that overall the event of warrant 
expirations no longer conveys information related to the underlying company therefore it 
brings no impact on the underlying shares. This confirms the argument of Bollen and Whaley 
(1999). 88 out of 138 samples in the total group are subsequent expiration warrants, therefore 
it is not surprise that both group show a similar outcome. The result of abnormal price effect 
also consistent with Hsu and Wang (2003), they also confirm insignificant result. There is an 
alternative explanation for the insignificant result of total sample group and subsequent group, 
that after warrant expired, there is a high possibility that the investment banks continue renew 
the warrants buy placing a new issue of covered warrant of the underlying shares. The new 
issue of covered warrant with the same underlying shares implicit extends the duration of the 
warrants, therefore it generate no significant price effect. This phenomenon could due to the 
strict regulation on the capitalization and diversification of the underlying shares, the issuer 
end up with limited choices. On the other hand, investment banks implicitly extend the 
duration of covered warrants also provide the hedge tool for the underlying share holders and 
hence maintain the trading liquidity of both underlying shares and the covered warrants. To 
                                                 
4 For the 50-day estimation period, results for in-the-money group show that –9, -3, -1, +3, +4 days within the 
event window have significant abnormal returns. However, 4 out of 5 show a negative coefficient. The 
out-of –money group confirms that there are positive price effects on days –9, -8, +6 and +10. 
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summarize, some issue of subsequent warrants can be seen as the extension of the original 
warrants therefore does not generate significant result, in addition, the subsequent warrants 
are the majority of the total sample group hence it also shows insignificant price effect.   
In sum, underlying stocks seem to exhibit significant abnormal returns both before and after 
the event day for the first time expired group, in-the-money group and out-of-the-money 
group, providing evidence of the existence of price effect on the covered warrants expiration. 
The results of the in the-money expired group show that there is a positive abnormal return 
before the warrant expiration and a negative abnormal return after the warrant expiration. The 
finding of the negative price effect after delisting is consistent to the result of Draper et al. 
(2001) and Chen and Wu (2001). Once the covered warrant is matured, investors will no 
longer have derivative to hedge their position in the underlying securities, therefore, investors 
might sell the underlying stock. Furthermore, the issuer will have no need to hold the hedge 
amount of underlying stocks they will also unwind the share position and induce the negative 
price effect post warrant expiration.  
 
4.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The result of the expiration of covered warrant shows the same features in both total data set 
and the subsequent expired samples. Both sample sets find none significant CAR during the 
event window around the warrant expirations.5 For the first time-expired group, when it 
comes to warrant expiration, there are significant positive price effects obtained within the 
event window, in particular, after the event days, on day –6 to day10.6 Again, there is lack of 
significance on the CARs for the total sample and subsequent sample sets; nevertheless, the 
                                                 
5 50-Days estimation confirms there is positive CAR on day –5 for the total sample set and none for the 
subsequent group.  
6 The first time-listed group with 50 days estimation period also shows the consistency.  
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first time expired group shows strange evidence of significant positive CARs. Recognizing 
the ex facie nature of the sample set, the first time expired warrants has brought impact on the 
underlying shares. The market participants no longer have the choice of covered warrants to 
invest in the underlying company; the demand might shift back to the underlying share market 
and therefore cause positive price effect around the warrant expiration.  
We further split our sample set by classifying the sample based on the in-the-money group 
and out-of –the money group. The in-the-money group generate negative cumulative 
abnormal returns on day -3. The out-of-the-money group with 150 days estimation period 
show that there is a positive cumulative abnormal returns on day –8, -7, -6,-5, -4 and + 10.7  
The total sample set, subsequent sample set show insignificant CAR around the warrant 
expirations. The first time expired and the out-of –the-money groups confirm there are 
positive significant cumulative abnormal returns around the warrant expiration. The 
in-the-money group finds significant negative price effect on day -3. We find that the whole 
sample result is more close to the findings in the first time expired and out-of-the-money 
group that there are positive CARs around the warrant expirations. The coefficients of the 
ARs and CARs after the warrant expirations are mostly negative for in-the-money group and 
the subsequent expired group.  
The strong positive price effect found in the first-time-expired group could due to the demand 
of the financial tool represents the underlying company shifts back to the spot market from the 
covered warrants market. The first introduction of the covered warrants can be seen as another 
asset for the market participants to invest in the underlying company, investors might be 
captivated by this new derivatives and the demand of the spot shares to the covered warrant 
                                                 
7 For 50 days estimation periods, results for in-the -money group show that –3 day within the event window 
have significant negative abnormal returns. The out-of –money group confirms that there is positive price effects 
most of the days within the event window (Day –8, -7,-6,-5,-4,-3,-2,0,2,8,9,10) 
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with the same underlying company. When it comes to the expiration, the demand of covered 
warrants will no longer exist and all the possible investment in the underlying company shift 
back the share market and therefore create a positive price effect. It is also tangible that the 
out-of-the-money warrants could bring some perplexity to the investors over the fair value of 
the underlying shares. When the call covered warrants are out-of-the-money it could bring 
down turn pressure on the underlying shares. Therefore, it could be a good news to the 
underlying share when a deep out-of-the -money call covered warrant is going to expire; 
because it will no longer have disfavor impact on the underlying share. In the heat of this 
finding one must not lost sight of the component of the total sample set. 106 out of 138 total 
samples are out-of-the-money covered warrants, this could explain why the total sample 
group exhibits similar result to the out-of-the-money group. In addition, the expired of 
in-the-money warrants implies that the issuer and holders of covered warrants start to release 
their hedging position of underlying shares after the covered warrant expired hence produce a 
downward price pressure on the underlying shares. This finding is consistent with Pope and 
Yadav (1992) and Chan and Wu (2001). 
  
4.3 Parametric and Non parametric tests for the equality of AR and CAR before and 
after warrant expiration.  
Table 4 presents the T test and nonparametric tests (The Wilcoxon test) for the equality of 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns before and after the warrant expiration. 
Only the first time-listed group shows a significant difference between pre and post abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns. The abnormal returns do not reject the equity before 
and after warrant expiration for the total sample and subsequent groups. The subsequent 
group shows significant difference in CARs after the warrants expired. The coefficient of 
CARs in Table 2 also confirms that CARs become negative after warrant delisting for the 
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subsequent group, although they are not significant.  
The results for average ARs during entire event window suggest positive average ARs for the 
total sample, as well the first time expired and out-of-the-money samples (Table 4 – Panel A). 
The results for average ARs during entire event window suggest negative average ARs for the 
subsequent expired and in-the-money samples Results for difference in average ARs, during 
the entire event window, suggest bigger average ARs for the first listings of sub-sample. 
(Table 4 –Panel B). Furthermore, bigger average ARs are generated for the out-of-the-money 
than the in-the-money group. The first sample and in-the-money sample show a downturn 
trend of stock return after warrant expiration. The Wilcoxon test confirms that abnormal 
returns are significant at 5 % level pre and post warrants expiration for only the first time 
expiration samples evidence of the impact of this event.   
Panel B in Table 4 presents the equality test between ARs / CARs of the first time expired and 
subsequent expired groups. Panel C in Table 4 presents the equality test between ARs / CARs 
of in-the-money and out-of-the-money groups. The empirical results further suggest 
significant variations between the first time expired (in-the-money) and subsequent 
(out-of-the-money) groups. Overall, the empirical evidence shows prominent features of 
in-the-money and out-of-the-money sample set. In-the-money warrants brings negative 
impact on the underlying shares and out-of-the-money group brings positive impact post 
warrants expiration. Because out-of-the-money warrants dominates most of the sample 
component in total sample group (106, 77%) and the first-time-expired group (40, 80%), both 
sample sets show similar results to the out-of-the-money group.8 One can conceive the issuer 
might no longer have any hedging position when the warrants are deep out-of-the-money. The 
                                                 
8 For the 50-day estimation, the total sample, in-the-money and out-of-the-money group confirms equality 
before and after warrant expiration. The CARs for the first-time expired group and the subsequent expired group 
are not equal pre and post expirations. Results of inequality between the ARs / CARs of in-the-money and 
out-of-the-money groups suggest similar findings to the 150-day estimation period.    
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expiry of these warrants could be good news to the underlying share because it no longer have 
potential to distort the market value of the shares, especially when all these warrants are call 
warrants. 
To sum up, the first time expired and subsequent sample sets generate significantly different 
results in price effect. The negative price effect in subsequent sample sets could due to the 
underlying share no longer have hedging tool and hence induce a distress on the underlying 
share price. The positive price effect in the first time expired confirms demand might shift 
back to the underlying share market. The in-the-money group generates similar result to 
Draper et al. (2001) and Chan and Wu (2001), that there is a negative price effect post warrant 
expiration. The down turn trend of the underlying share price may be induced by the warrant 
exercise and warrant issuer unwinding the hedging position. The out-of-the-money finds 
positive price effect prior to the warrant expiration, this implies that the deep 
out-of-the-money warrant may distress the interest of the market participants hence the 
expiration of these warrant becomes a good news to the underlying shares. The empirical 
evidence confirms the hypotheses for significant price effect around the underlying share 
expiration, and different feature between the first time/subsequent sample sets and 
in-the-money and out-of-the-money warrants.  
 
4.4. Abnormal Trading Volume 
4.4.1. Nonparametric Test 
The result for the Wilcoxon Test of median RViB = RViA vs. median RViB not= median RViA 
provides the evidence that there is no difference between relative trading volume before and 
after warrant expiration. The total sample, first time expired, subsequent expired, 
in-the-money and out-of-the-money groups all find that there is no difference in relative 
trading volume before and after the warrant expiration. The comparison between the first time 
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expired group and the subsequent expired group confirms significant difference in the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon test but not the T test.   
This result confirms the difference between cumulative abnormal trading volume 100 days 
pre and post warrants expiration. The empirical evidence confirms that in the long term, 
trading volume of the underlying share is not influenced by the event of warrant expiration. 
To investigate the behaviour of change of trading volume associate with change of the price 
for underlying shares around the warrant expiration, we choose daily turnover ratio of out 
proxy to further investigate abnormal trading volume within the event window.  
 
4.4.2 Relative Abnormal Trading Volume 
Table 6 presents relative abnormal trading volumes within the event window. Consistent with 
the abnormal price effect, we generate there are significant trading volume around the warrant 
expiration for the total sample, the first time expired, the subsequent and the out-of-the-money 
groups. Nerveless, the in-the-money group, find there is little evidence of significant change 
on underlying share trading volume around the warrant expiration. The insignificant trading 
volume for in-the-money group could due to lost of the attraction from the investors after 
warrants expired, it is also could because the reason that the warrant issuer and holders are 
selling their hedging position creating a downturn price pressure to distress the underlying 
share and this makes the underlying share becomes unpopular. The other plausible 
explanation could because after the warrants expired, there is no longer a hedging tool for the 
investors, the underlying shares therefore disfavour by the market participants. However, the 
result of abnormal trading volume for in-the-money group still associated with the price effect 
that there is a positive abnormal trading volume prior to the warrant expiration and negative 
trading volume post the expirations. Moreover, the exercise of the underlying share will not 
induce a dramatic change in the underlying share trading volume due to the hedging position 
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of the issuer. When the warrant holder comes along to exercise the warrant, instead of 
purchasing from the spot market, the issuer unwinding the pre-constructed hedging position to 
the warrant holder. The insignificant abnormal trading volume in in-the-money warrant 
groups can be explained by the reason that there is no unwinding behaviour from the issuer. 
Furthermore, if the issuer chooses to have cash settlement for the exercise of covered warrant, 
then there will be no selling behaviour from the warrant holder. Our empirical result in 
in-the-money group however is different from Chan and Wu (2001) in Hong Kong, the find a 
positive abnormal trading volume for in-the-money group. 
 
4.4.3 Parametric and Non parametric tests for the equality of AR and CAR before and 
after warrant expiration.  
Table 7 reports results of inequality test in average abnormal trading volume before and after 
warrant expirations for each sample group. All sample sets cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that abnormal trading volume are equalize before and after warrant expiration. This finding is 
consistent with what have been observed in change of the abnormal trading volumes during 
the event window. That there are positive abnormal trading volumes for the total, first time 
expired and out-of-the-money groups; and there is insignificant abnormal trading volume for 
in-the-money group and negative abnormal trading volume 1 day prior to the warrant 
expiration for the subsequent expired group.  
Panel B and Panel C in the Table 7 report the equality tests of abnormal trading volume 
during the event window between the first/subsequent expired groups and the 
in/out-of-the –money groups. Empirical evidence confirms that there is significant difference 
between the abnormal trading volume between the first time expired group and the subsequent 
expired group. The in-the-money group and the out-of-the-money group also confirm the 
same results. There results are consistent with what have found in abnormal trading volume of 
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each sample group during the event window. There are positive abnormal trading volume 
around the warrant expirations for the first time expired warrants but there is negative 
abnormal trading volume 1 day prior to the expiration for the subsequent expired group. 
In-the-money group generate negative abnormal trading volume post warrants expiration 
whereas the out-of-the-money group find positive abnormal trading pre and post warrants 
expiration.  
To summarize, empirical results in trading volumes for the total sample, first time expired and 
out-of-the-money groups are consistent with Stall and Whaley (1990), Draper et al. (2001), 
and Chen and Wu (2001) that there is significant abnormal trading volumes around the 
warrant expiration. The negative but insignificant abnormal trading volume for in-the-money 
group might explain the downward price effect make the underlying share become less 
popular. Investors might prefer to trade share, which has similar feature, but with a covered 
warrant yet not expired.   
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the impact of warrants expiration on the underlying shares. The 
primary objective is to investigate the trading behaviour of the underlying shares around the 
covered warrants expiration. Research has been in the vanguard of the study to examine the 
impact of options expiration on the underlying shares. This paper, to the best of our 
knowledge, is the first attempt to investigate abnormal trading volume around warrants 
expiration in Taiwan, and the second with a relatively large sample sets and subgroups in 
examining the price effect and abnormal trading volume around warrant expiration.9   
Consistent with study for Chen and Wu (2001) in the Hong Kong market, we find there is 
significant positive price effect prior to and negative price effect after the expiration dates for 
                                                 
9 Hsu and Wang (2003) examine abnormal price effect in Taiwan with 9 warrants.  
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in-the-money warrants. The in-the-money group and the subsequent group shows result which 
is consistent with Draper et al. (2001) and Chan and Wu (2001) that there is negative CAR 
after the warrant expiration. The results from first expiration and out-of-the money groups are 
more consistent that there are positive CARs and positive abnormal trading volumes around 
the warrant expirations.  
Although results from in-the-money, out-of-the-money and the first-time-expired, and 
subsequent expired group are inconsistent. One shall not claim that these results are 
contradictive. There are some plausible reasons might explain the outcome in in-the-money 
group. First, when it comes to the warrants expiration, if the covered warrants are 
in-the-money, the warrants holders would go to the issuer to ask for warrant exercise. These 
warrant exercise actions do not affect the trading of the underlying shares simply because of 
the hedging position of the issuer already covers the demand and also sufficient to allow the 
exercise, when it approaches to the expirations, the issuer would have to deconstruct their 
hedging position so there will be negative price effect after the warrant expirations. Secondly, 
the issuer also possibly mark up the underlying share price in order to attract the other market 
participants and later on they can easily get rid of their hedging position, and this action might 
cause a temporary positive price effect.  
The plausible explanation for the positive abnormal return in first time expiration group could 
due to the shift of investment tool demand from the warrant market to the underlying shares. 
The probable reason for the significant price effect on out-of-the-money sample could due to 
the new of warrants expiration is considered good news the underlying shares. The issuer and 
warrant holders may gradually unwind their position long time ago hence there is no 
downward pressure to the underlying shares. Furthermore, due to the strict market 
capitalization and diversification regulation in qualification of the underlying shares. The 
issuer may issue a new warrant with the same underlying shares or still hold the hedging 
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position as a reserve for next warrant issuance. Therefore, it is reasonable that there is no 
significant downturn price pressure on out-of-the money and the total sample group, since the 
majority of the covered warrants in our sample (76%) is expired out-of-the-money. 
The first time expired covered warrants might have different features compares to the 
subsequent expired warrants. Investors may consider first time listed warrants as a 
substitution of the underlying share to invest in underlying company. After the warrants 
expired the investment in a particular underlying company will all shift back to the only 
financial tool, the underlying share. This brings a positive price effect and trading volume to 
the underlying shares. The subsequent expired warrants play the function more like a hedging 
tool. Once if those warrants expired, investors might shift away to the other warranted-shares 
and therefore cause a downward price pressure to the underlying shares.  
This paper seeks to address the impact of warrant expiration on the underlying shares. It 
proposes several sample groups in which such impact may emerge different outcome. Overall, 
the hypotheses of there are significant price effect and abnormal trading volume around the 
warrant expirations cannot be rejected. The hypotheses of different price effect and trading 
volume in sub groups also have been confirmed. This study makes extensive of data from 
Taiwanese market and several sample groups; the empirical analysis can also serve as a means 
to improve academic knowledge of impact derivative expiration event on the underlying 
shares. We conclude that the feature of the sample set does generate different results and we 
also provider alternative explanations to the empirical outcome.  
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Table 1 Population and Sample Covered Warrants Stratified -By Year of Expiration 
Population consists of all single covered warrants. Sample consists of first time, and subsequently, expired 
warrants on individual share, from the market’s inception (August 1997),until August 2003.  Trading values in 
US$ ( million). Exchange rates TW$/US$: 1997 (26.66), 1998 (33.44), 1999 (32.27), 2000 (31.23), 2001 (33.80), 
2002 (34.58), 2003 (34.42). Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) Fact Book, and authors’ calculations. 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population:  
- Total number of warrants 3 9 34 43 46 84
- Trading value of warrants 384 1,905 4,772 836 2,190 3,480
- Trading value of all TSE shares 890,994 907,813 977,632 543,045 632,651 595,902
Sample: 
- Number of sample warrants 3 8 24 28 31 44
(number of first time expired) (3) (2) (12) (8) (7) (18)
- Trading value of warrants 282 1,320 2,247 530 1,180 346
- Trading value of sample shares 182,898 306,244 247,565 194,689 169,145 78,875
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Table 2  Daily Abnormal (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) (150 days) 
Total sample consists of both, first time and subsequently expired warrants on the underlying shares. Average 
(mean) ARs and CARs within the event window in percentage terms. The level of significance for the two-tailed T 
test of mean = 0 vs. mean ≠ 0 indicated as:*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 
10% level. Unreported results for the Sign test of median = 0 vs. median ≠ 0 total sample abnormal returns 
confirm results of the T-test for –10 at 10%. Unreported results for the Sign test of median = 0 vs. median ≠ 0 
first time expired abnormal returns confirms results of the T-test for 2 at 5% level. Unreported results for the 
Sign test of median = 0 vs. median ≠ 0 subsequent expired abnormal returns confirms results of the T-test 
for –3,2,3 at 5% level. The sign tests for the CAR are all significant from zero during the event window for all 
three groups.  
•  
Total sample First time expired Subsequent expired 
Day AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
-10 -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0181 -0.0181 -0.0124 -0.0124 
-9 0.0739 0.0421 0.2038 0.1314 0.0001 -0.0087 
-8 0.1177 0.1023 0.2004 0.2229 0.0707 0.0337 
-7 0.0189 0.0980 0.0306 0.2083 0.0123 0.0353 
-6 0.1031 0.1338 0.2039 0.2775** 0.0458 0.0521 
-5 0.0238 0.1318 0.0436 0.2711** 0.0126 0.0527 
-4 -0.1083 0.0811 -0.0455 0.2338** -0.1440 -0.0057 
-3 -0.0966 0.0417 0.0929 0.2516** -0.2042** -0.0775 
-2 0.0663 0.0615 0.2978** 0.3365*** -0.0652 -0.0948 
-1 -0.0016 0.0578 -0.0529 0.3024** 0.0275 -0.0812 
0 0.0629 0.0741 0.2512** 0.3641*** -0.0441 -0.0907 
1 0.0097 0.0737 -0.1396 0.3083** 0.0945 -0.0596 
2 0.0207 0.0765 0.2952** 0.3781*** -0.1353 -0.0948 
3 -0.0950 0.0484 -0.1154 0.3335*** -0.0834 -0.1136 
4 -0.1368 0.0114 -0.1349 0.2874** -0.1380 -0.1454 
5 -0.0217 0.0056 -0.0075 0.2764** -0.0298 -0.1482 
6 0.1370 0.0387 0.1260 0.2987** 0.1433 -0.1091 
7 -0.0036 0.0367 -0.0495 0.2786** 0.0225 -0.1007 
8 0.1329 0.0662 0.1251 0.2999** 0.1373 -0.0665 
9 -0.0258 0.0588 0.0488 0.3032** -0.0682 -0.0801 
10 0.1174 0.0830 0.2119 0.3421*** 0.0638 -0.0642 
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Table 3  Daily Abnormal (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) (150 days) 
Total sample consists of both, in and out-of-the-money expired warrants on the underlying shares. Average 
(mean) ARs and CARs within the event window in percentage terms. The level of significance for the two-tailed T 
test of mean = 0 vs. mean ≠ 0 indicated as*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 
10% level. Unreported results for the Sign test of median = 0 vs. median ≠ 0 in the money sample abnormal 
returns confirm results of the T-test for 3 at 5%. Unreported results for the Sign test of median = 0 vs. median ≠ 0 
out of the money group abnormal returns confirms results of the T-test for -1 at 5% level.  
In the money sample Out of the money sample 
Day AR CAR AR CAR 
-10 0.0814 0.0814 -0.0166 -0.0166 
-9 -0.2818 -0.1417 0.1731** 0.1107 
-8 -0.0551 -0.1475 0.1594** 0.1824** 
-7 -0.1004 -0.1779 0.0405 0.1782** 
-6 -0.0498 -0.1814 0.1455 0.2245*** 
-5 -0.1036 -0.2079 0.0474 0.2243*** 
-4 -0.0981 -0.2295 -0.1281 0.1592** 
-3 -0.2782 -0.3131** -0.0492 0.1315 
-2 0.1451 -0.2468 0.0366 0.1362 
-1 0.3694** -0.1173 -0.1163 0.0924 
0 -0.0205 -0.1180 0.0919 0.1159 
1 0.1150 -0.0798 -0.0104 0.1079 
2 -0.1620 -0.1216 0.0815 0.1263 
3 -0.3653** -0.2148 -0.0317 0.1132 
4 -0.3146** -0.2888 -0.0880 0.0867 
5 0.0323 -0.2715 -0.0504 0.0713 
6 0.0283 -0.2566 0.1800** 0.1129 
7 -0.0910 -0.2708 0.0067 0.1113 
8 0.0905 -0.2428 0.1500 0.1427 
9 -0.0486 -0.2476 -0.0069 0.1376 
10 0.0714 -0.2260 0.1717** 0.1717** 
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Table 4  Average ARs and CARs Before and After Expirations (150 days) 
Total sample consists of both, first time and subsequently expired warrants on the underlying shares. Average 
(mean and median) AR and CAR, 10 days before expirations, and 10 days after expirations. Median returns 
reported in (brackets). P-values [in parentheses] indicate the level of significance for the differences in mean 
(t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) AR and CAR, before and after expirations. Unreported results for 
Kruskal-Wallis test confirm reported results for differences between median returns. The level of significance for 
the two-tailed T, and Wilcoxon tests, for mean/median = 0 vs. mean/median ≠ 0 given as: *** significant at 1%; 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
                       Total Sample       First time expired        Subsequent expired
 N AR CAR N AR CAR N AR CAR 
Before expiration 138 0.00 (0.02) 0.07(0.07) 50 0.10 (0.07) 0.22 (0.24) 88 -0.03(0.01) -0.01(-0.01) 
After expiration 138 0.02 (0.02) 0.05(0.06) 50 0.06 (0.05) 0.31 (0.30) 88 -0.03(0.01) -0.10(-0.10) 
During event window 138 0.02 (0.02) 0.04(0.06) 50 0.07 (0.05) 0.27(0.28) 88 -0.03(0.01) -0.06(-0.08) 
Difference (before-after) -0.02 (0.0) 0.02(0.01)  0.04(0.02) -0.09(-0.06)  0.00 (0.00) 0.09(0.09) 
P-value for T-test [0.90] [0.20]  [0.01] [0.01]  [0.97] [0.00] 
P-value for Wilcoxon test [0.97] [0.22]  [0.01] [0.00]  [0.91] [0.00] 
 
                       In the Money Sample     Out of the Money Sample 
 N AR CAR N AR CAR 
       
Before expiration 32 -0.04 (-0.08) -0.19 (-0.18) 106 0.03 (0.04) 0.14 (0.15) 
       
After expiration 32 -0.06 (-0.02) -0.21 (-0.24) 106 0.05 (0.01) 0.12 (0.11) 
       
During event 32 -0.05 (-0.05) -0.19 (-0.21) 106 0.04 (0.04) 0.13 (0.13) 
      
      
Difference 0.2 (-0.06) -0.02 (-0.06)  -0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04) 
      
P-value for T-test [0.77] [0.27]  [0.73] [0.30] 
P-value for Wilcoxon [0.86] [0.25]  [0.75] [0.17] 
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Panel B: Difference between first time expired group and subsequent expired group 
Panel B presents the 2 sample T-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the difference between the first time 
expiration group and the subsequent expiration group. The differences between the AR, CAR and Sign value for 
both groups are examined.   
First time vs. Subsequent (AR) First time vs. Subsequent (CAR)
 N  N  
First 50 0.07 (0.05) First 50 0.27 (0.29)
     
Subsequent 88 -0.01 (-0.01) Subsequent 88 -0.06 (-0.08)
     
Difference  -0.08 (-0.04) Difference  0.33(0.37)
     
P-value for T-test  [0.02] P-value for T-test  [0.00] 
P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.05] P-value for Wilcoxon test  [0.00] 
 
Panel C: Difference between in the money group and out of the money group 
Panel B presents the 2 sample T-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the difference between the in the 
money expiration group and the out of the money expiration group. The differences between the AR, CAR and 
Sign value for both groups are examined.   
 
In vs. Out of the Money (AR) In vs. Out of the Money (CAR)
 N  N  
In the money 32 -0.05 (-0.05) In the money 32 -0.19 (-0.21)
     
Out of the money 106 0.04 (0.04) Out of the money 106 0.13 (0.13)
     
Difference  -0.09 (-0.09) Difference  -0.32 (-0.34)
     
P-value for T-test  [0.05] P-value for T-test  [0.00] 
P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.04] P-value for Wilcoxon test  [0.00] 
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Table 5  Relative Trading Volume Ratios 
Panel A contents total sample consists of both, first time and subsequently expiration warrants on the underlying 
shares. RViB stands for average (mean and median) relative trading volume ratio100 days before the warrants 
expirations; RViA stands for the average (mean and median) relative trading volume ratio 100 days after the 
warrants expirations. Median RViB and RViA reported in (brackets). The ratio is presented in P-values [in 
parentheses] indicate the level of significance for the differences in mean (T-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) 
ratios before and after expirations.  
Panel A: RViB and RViA for total, first time and subsequent expiration groups.  
 
Sample Set N Total sample N First time N Subsequent
 
RViB 138 0.93. (0.63) 50 0.79 (0.52) 88 1.01 (0.73) 
RViA 138 0.86 (0.59) 50 0.76 (0.45) 88 0.93 (0.65) 
  
Difference (RViB-RViA) 0.09 (0.04)  0.03 (0.07)  0.08 (0.8) 
P-value for T-test [0.48]  [0.83]  [0.47] 
P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.25]  [0.46]  [0.29] 
 
Panel B: RViB and RViA for in the money and out of the money expiration groups. 
Panel B consists in the money group and out of the money group. RViB stands for average (mean and median) 
relative trading volume ratio100 days before the warrants expirations; RViA stands for the average (mean and 
median) relative trading volume ratio 100 days after the warrants expirations. Median RViB and RViA reported 
in (brackets). The ratio is presented in P-values [in parentheses] indicate the level of significance for the 
differences in mean (T-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) ratios before and after expirations.  
 
Sample Set N In the Money N Out of the Money 
 
RViB 32 1.07 (0.75) 50 0.89 (0.57) 
RViA 32 0.98 (0.62) 50 0.83 (0.58) 
 
Difference (RViB-RViA) 0.09 (0.13)  0.06 (-0.01) 
P-value for T-test [0.67]  [0.58] 
P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.36]  [0.48] 
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Panel C: Difference between first time expired group and subsequent expired group 
Panel C presents the 2 sample T-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the difference between the first time 
expiration group and the subsequent expiration group. The differences between the RViB and RViA values for 
both groups are examined.   
 
       First time vs. Subsequent  RViB        First time vs. Subsequent  RViA 
 N   N  
First 50 0.79 (0.52) First 50 0.76 (0.45) 
      
Subsequent 88 1.01 (0.73) Subsequent 88 0.93 (0.65) 
      
Difference  -0.22 (-0.19) Difference  -0.17 (-0.20) 
      
P-value for T-test  [0.14] P-value for T-test  [0.22] 
P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.03] P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.06] 
 
Panel D: Difference between in the money and out of the money expiration group 
Panel D presents the 2 sample T-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the difference between the in the 
money group and the out of the money expiration group. The differences between the RViB and RViA values for 
both groups are examined.   
 
     In vs. Out of the Money  RViB In vs. Out of the Money  RViA 
 N   N  
In the Money 32 1.07 (0.75) In the Money 32 0.98 (0.62) 
      
Out of the Money 106 0.89 (0.57) Out of the Money 106 0.83 (0.58) 
      
Difference  0.18 (0.18) Difference  0.15 (0.04) 
      
P-value for T-test  [0.28] P-value for T-test  [0.35] 
P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.09] P-value for Wilcoxon  [0.38] 
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Table 6  Daily Abnormal Trading Volume (AV) (150 days) 
Mean AV during the event window calculated as in equation 5 in percentage terms. The level of significance for 
the T- test for mean = 0 vs. mean 0, calculated as in equation 8, given as: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10% 
 
 Total sample First time expired Subsequent expired 
Day AV AV AV
-10 13.5472** 11.2918** 8.1606 
-9 24.1182*** 21.3236*** 9.2537 
-8 31.6304*** 32.8577*** 22.4018***
-7 27.2312*** 25.8267*** 18.1523***
-6 19.7551*** 16.6162*** 9.9881 
-5 21.6121*** 19.2811*** 16.8522**
-4 13.5615** 10.9613** 10.5911 
-3 4.6588 4.2817 -5.7145 
-2 13.9917** 12.7555** 1.1524 
-1 6.6597 5.6160 -12.9483**
0 20.2142*** 18.9611*** 0.2414 
1 28.2714*** 28.3478*** 11.9108 
2 27.3362*** 28.6335*** 12.4448 
3 19.2705*** 19.8536*** 4.7892 
4 5.2539 6.1024 -1.1800 
5 0.9821 1.6700 -2.1431 
6 4.8213 3.2691 4.4833 
7 12.4308** 12.4724** 12.8889**
8 22.6926*** 24.0656*** 17.5790**
9 22.2574*** 24.5014*** 17.4323**
10 17.8934*** 18.9171** 16.9640**
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Table 6  Daily Abnormal Trading Volume (AV) (150 days) 
Mean AV during the event window calculated as in equation 5 in percentage terms. The level of significance for 
the T- test for mean = 0 vs. mean 0, calculated as in equation 8, given as: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10% 
 
 In the Money sample Out of the Money  
Day AV AV
-10 16.8534 12.5676 
-9 0.0797 31.2407***
-8 3.3500 40.0098***
-7 4.0996 34.0850***
-6 1.4468 25.1798***
-5 17.0437** 22.9657***
-4 1.2301 17.2152 **
-3 -6.2936 7.9040 
-2 2.7961 17.3089**
-1 -4.2990 9.9067 
0 -3.0413 27.1047***
1 -2.3654 37.3489***
2 7.4582 33.2259***
3 -4.1237 26.2021***
4 -5.3785 8.4043 
5 -5.1036 2.7853 
6 -18.2801** 11.6662**
7 6.0285 14.3278**
8 4.4842 28.0877***
9 -2.0808 29.4687***
10 0.3557 23.0897**
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Table 7  Average AVs Before and After Expirations (150 days) 
Total sample consists of both, first time and subsequently expired warrants on the underlying shares. Average 
(mean and median) AV, 10 days before expiration, and 10 days after expirations. Median abnormal trading 
volume are reported in (brackets). P-values [in parentheses] indicate the level of significance for the differences 
in mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon test) AR, before and after expirations. Results for both in the money and 
out of the money group are also reported below. Unreported results for Kruskal-Wallis test confirm reported 
results for differences between median returns. The level of significance for the two-tailed T, and Wilcoxon tests, 
for mean/median = 0 vs. mean/median ≠ 0 given as: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%. 
Panel A: Average AVs Before and After Expirations 
             Total Sample First time expired Subsequent expired
 N AV N AV N AV 
       
Before expired 138 16.49(19.27) 50 16.08 (14.69) 88    7.79 (9.62) 
       
After expired 138 17.68(16.87) 50 16.98(18.96) 88 8.67 (11.91) 
       
During event 138 17.06(19.27) 50 16.55 (18.92) 88 8.25 (9.99) 
      
      
Difference (before-after) -1.19(2.40)  -0.90(-4.27)  -0.88(-2.29) 
      
P-value for T-test [0.77]  [0.83]  [0.83] 
P-value for Wilcoxon test [0.86]  [0.81]  [0.92] 
 
             In the money sample Out of the money sample
 N AV N AV 
     
Before expired 32 3.63(-2.00) 106 21.84 (20.14) 
     
After expired 32 2.12(-2.37) 106 21.97 (26.20) 
     
During event 32 0.68(0.36) 106 21.91 (23.09) 
    
Difference (before-after) 1.51(0.37)  -0.13(-6.06) 
    
P-value for T-test [0.10]  [0.98] 
P-value for Wilcoxon test [0.22]  [0.92] 
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Panel B: Difference between first time expired and subsequent expired group 
Panel B presents the 2 sample T-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the difference between the first time 
expired group and the subsequent expired group. The differences between the Abnormal trading volumes for both 
groups are examined.   
       First time vs. Subsequent  (Abnormal trading volume)
 N  
First 50 16.55 (18.92) 
   
Subsequent 88 8.25(9.99) 
   
Difference  8.3(8.93) 
   
P-value for T-test  [0.01] 
P-value for Wilcoxon test  [0.01] 
 
Panel C: Difference between in-the-money group and out-of-the-money group 
Panel B presents the 2 sample T-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test for the difference between the 
in-the-money group and out-of-the-money group. The differences between the Abnormal trading volumes for both 
groups are examined.   
 
     In vs. Out of the Money  (Abnormal trading volume)
 N  
In of the Money 32 0.68 (0.36) 
   
Out of the Money 106 21.91(23.09) 
   
Difference  -21.35(-22.73) 
   
P-value for T-test  [0.00] 
P-value for Wilcoxon test  [0.00] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
